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Abstract
The problem of cascading failures in cyber-physical systems is drawing much attention in lieu of different
network models for a diverse range of applications. While many analytic results have been reported for the case
of large networks, very few of them are readily applicable to finite-size networks. This paper studies cascading
failures in finite-size geometric networks where the number of nodes is on the order of tens or hundreds as in many
real-life networks. First, the impact of the tolerance parameter on network resiliency is investigated. We quantify
the network reaction to initial disturbances of different sizes by measuring the damage imposed on the network.
Lower and upper bounds on the number of failures are derived to characterize such damages. Such finite-size
analysis reveals the decisiveness and criticality of taking action within the first few stages of failure propagation in
preventing a cascade. By studying the trend of the bounds as the number of nodes increases, we observe a phase
transition phenomenon in terms of the tolerance parameter. The critical value of the tolerance parameter, known as
the threshold, is further derived. The findings of this paper, in particular, shed light on how to choose the tolerance
parameter appropriately such that a cascade of failures could be avoided.
Index Terms
Cascading Failure, Finite-Size Complex Networks, Random Geometric Graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cascading failure in a complex network is a phenomenon in which the failure of a small set of nodes
triggers the failure of successive nodes, leading to the failure of a large fraction of the network eventually.
There have been many types of cascading failure events that occurred in natural and man-made systems,
from power grid and computer networks to political, economic, and ecological systems. Cascading failure
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2is common in power grids, where a single failure of a fully loaded or slightly overloaded node (component)
could set off more overloads, thereby taking down the entire system in a very short time. A few examples
of power outages caused by cascading failures are the blackouts in northeast America in 2003, Italy in
2003, London in 2003, and northern India in 2012. Cascading failures can also occur in computer networks
(such as the Internet), when a crucial router or node becomes overloaded. Network traffic then needs to be
re-routed through an alternative path. This alternative path, as a result, may become overloaded, causing
path break-down, and so on.
The problem of cascading failures in complex networks has been studied extensively [1]–[8], especially
for large networks. For the sake of tractability, different types of random graphs have been used to model
complex networks, including Bernoulli random graphs, random geometric graphs, and scale-free graphs
[9]–[13]. Also, depending on the underlying applications, different models of failure propagation have
been considered, where two popular categories of propagation rules are the degree-based and load-based
propagation, respectively. In a degree-based propagation, the state of each node is determined by the states
of all or part of its neighbors in the network [1], [4], [9], [12], [13]. For example, in [9], each node is
assigned a random threshold φ, and it fails if at least a fraction φ of its neighbors fail. On the other hand,
in a load-based propagation, the state of a node is defined over the amount of load that it carries [2], [10].
For instance in [10], each node can carry a load up to its capacity, above which it becomes overloaded.
An overloaded node fails and redistributes its load to its neighbors.
While the vast majority of the existing analytical studies are focused on large-scale networks, their
findings can hardly be applied to the small or moderate size networks that we usually face in the real
world. In this paper, we are concerned with providing rigorous analytical results for finite-size networks.
Furthermore, we are interested in studying cascading failures in networks with geometric characteristics
such as electrical power grids and wireless communication networks, which could be well-modeled as
random geometric graphs. Indeed, random geometric graphs have been widely used in studying wireless
networks (see [14] and references therein). As expected, it is shown that geometry plays an important
role in quantifying the topology of the smart grid communication and control networks [15].
We adopt a load-based failure propagation in this paper as it makes sense in a set of important
applications such as the power grid and wireless networks. We assume that each node has a certain
capacity, part of which is used to carry a load in normal conditions. If, for any reason, a node receives
more load than its capacity, it fails and redistributes its load to its neighbors. A node here could be a
3component in a power grid, such as a transmission line or a regional transformer, which usually operates
in normal conditions but is able to handle some higher loads up to a certain capacity. A node could also
be a device in a wireless distributed storage network, or a routing hub in the Internet. In all these cases,
a node could be assumed to operate under a certain load in normal situations, while it is able to handle
a higher load up to a limit, if necessary.
The relative gap between the capacity and the normal load of a node is specified by the tolerance
parameter [2], [10]. Tolerance parameter is a design parameter that plays an important role in network
resiliency against a cascade. When resiliency is the priority, a larger tolerance parameter is desired as it
enables the network to handle more severe operation disturbances. However, a larger tolerance parameter
leads to a larger unused capacity that imposes higher costs. Therefore, it is crucial to obtain a clear
understanding of the impact of tolerance parameter on network reactions to disruptions of different scales.
In this paper, we characterize such reactions through analytical means in both finite and asymptotic
regimes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formally state the problem and
explain the main contributions of this paper. In Section III, we provide some notation and preliminaries
helpful for understanding the analysis. Sections IV, V, and VI provide the main results and the bulk of
the analysis. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we explain the models we use for the network, the initial disturbance, and the propagation
of failures due to a disturbance. Furthermore, we introduce a method to quantify the overall damage caused
by an initial disturbance. Given all that, we will formally state the problem and briefly discuss our main
contributions.
A. Network Model
In this paper, we consider a network modeled by a random geometric graph G(λ,R), whose nodes are
deployed in a region S according to a Poisson point process with density λ. There is an edge between
each pair of nodes if their Euclidean distance is less than R. We assume that S is a circular region with
diameter D and centered at the origin 0. However, the results presented in this paper can be extended to
other types of deployment regions with minimal changes. Initially, all the nodes carry the same amount
of load l, and have the same capacity c = αl, where α ≥ 1 is the tolerance parameter. While the load of
4each node may change over time, the capacity remains the same. A node is called “healthy” if it carries
a load less than or equal to its capacity.
Connected vs. Disconnected Graphs: By definition, in a connected network, there exists a path between
any two arbitrary nodes in the network. For G(λ,R), connectivity is only guaranteed when λ → ∞. In
practice, however, the probability of connectivity could be arbitrarily close to 1 if λ is chosen large enough.
Note that G(λ,R) defines a probability space with a sample space consisting of all possible realizations
of G(λ,R). For finite values of λ, let Gc(λ,R) be the connected subspace of the larger probability space
G(λ,R), formed by all the connected realizations of G(λ,R). In our analysis, whenever connectivity is
needed, we will consider Gc(λ,R). In simulations, however, it is extremely time-consuming to check
the connectivity of each realization. Therefore, in order to have a connectivity probability close to 1,
we assume λ is chosen such that λpiR2 ≥ 6. Hence, the probability of a node being isolated, which
accounts for the dominant term in the probability of disconnectivity, is upper-bounded as exp(−λpiR2) ≤
exp(−6) = 2.5× 10−3 [16].
B. Initial Disturbance and Propagation of Failures
A dish attack on S is modeled by a circle A of radius Ra < D/2 centered at the origin. This is shown
in Fig. 1. After the attack, all the nodes located at a distance r < Ra from the center of attack will fail,
and their load will be redistributed to their neighbors, which in turn may lead to a propagation of failures
throughout the network. We assume that a dish attack only affects the nodes inside the dish, not the ones
located on its border at r = Ra. We focus on the set of conditions under which a cascading failure is
realized, and study the corresponding damage caused by such a cascade. We assume the following model
for the propagation of failures. At any stage of cascade, when a node fails, its load will be redistributed
equally among its healthy neighbors. A node that carries a total load greater than its capacity will fail.
C. Quantifying the Damage
The number of failures at each stage of load redistribution is clearly a random variable (r.v.). In order to
quantify the impact of an attack on the network, we use the total number of failures outside the attacked
region, caused by a limited dish attack. Let F denote this number. We define failure ratio as
f ,
F
|S \ A| , (1)
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Fig. 1. Dish attack (shaded area) in a random geometric graph.
where |S \A| is the total number of nodes outside the attack region, including the nodes on A’s boundary.
We use the average value of the random variable f taken over all realizations of G(λ,R), denoted by f¯ ,
to measure the impact of an attack. We are particularly interested in the variation of f¯ with the tolerance
parameter α. Fig. 2 shows f¯ versus α for a typical dish attack on a network where Ra = R = 0.1 and
D = 1, for different values of λ.
D. Main Results
As noted above, we discussed the insufficiency of the existing asymptotic analyses when applied to
finite-size applications. In this paper, we study the reaction of a finite-size network G(λ,R) to a dish
attack of an arbitrary radius Ra by providing analytical results for f¯ in terms of λ, R, Ra, and the most
important parameter, α. Finding the exact value of f¯ in the finite regime could be very difficult and, if
found, it may very well result in computationally intensive, if not intractable, arguments. Instead, we focus
on deriving bounds with manageable computational complexity that help us understand the variations of
f¯ as the network parameters change. We summarized our main contributions as follows.
• We start by investigating the first few stages of load redistribution after a dish attack, particularly
finding the load redistributed to nodes in A1 immediately after the attack. We extend this analysis to
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Fig. 2. Average failure ratio versus α in both finite and large-scale networks when Ra = R = 0.1 and D = 1. As λ grows larger, a
threshold behavior with respect to the tolerance parameter is observed.
obtain an upper bound on the average failure ratio f¯ , which especially helps us choose an appropriate
value of α to avoid a cascade.
• In order to derive a lower bound, we consider a favorable scenario for absorbing the load redistributed
from failed nodes, by assuming a desirable network topology and full node cooperation. It will be
shown that, even in such an optimistic scenario, the chance to stop a cascade becomes smaller and
smaller as the failures propagate through the network. This leads to a lower bound on f¯ .
• The two bounds together provide us with insights into the speed and extent of a failure cascade
through the network. Our analysis reveals the critical role of the first few stages of load redistribution
in preventing a cascade. In other words, our results indicate that if a spread of failures is not contained
immediately or within the first few stages, a cascade of failures would most likely bring down a large
portion of the network.
• As seen from Fig. 2, the failure ratio changes rather quickly over a short interval of α. It will be
shown that this interval diminishes to zero as λ increases, indicating a phase transition phenomenon.
Investigating the proposed upper bound on f¯ as λ → ∞ reveals the existence of a threshold value
of α, denoted as αU , such that f¯ = 1 if α < αU , and f¯ = 0 if α ≥ αU . We will derive αU in terms
of other network parameters.
7III. PRELIMINARIES
Here, we provide some notation and preliminaries required for the analysis. We denote the number of
nodes in the attack region A by a. Note that a is a Poisson r.v. with parameter
a¯ = δ2a = λpiR
2
a. (2)
It makes sense to assume that a dish attack is large enough to affect at least one node, for which we
assume a¯ = λpiR2a ≥ 3 in this paper, which yields Pr(a ≥ 1) > 0.95.
Consider the rings (annuli) of width R around the attacked region, as depicted in Fig. 1. For i ≥ 1, we
denote an annulus with inner radius Ri−1 = Ra + (i − 1)R and outer radius Ri = Ra + iR by Ai, and
the set of nodes in Ai by Ai. We denote the cardinality of Ai by ai. Note that ai, which is the number
of nodes in the ring Ai, is simply a Poisson random variable with parameter
a¯i = δ
2
ai
= λpi(R2i − R2i−1). (3)
The following lemmas will help us in our sequential analysis, whose proofs are provided in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Let a¯ = λpiR2a ≥ 3 and λpiR2 ≥ 6, as assumed in this paper. We then have
a¯i > 14, i ≥ 1. (4)
Since a¯i is greater than 10, Lemma 1 implies that the Poisson r.v. ai could be well approximated by
a Gaussian r.v. for i ≥ 1 [17]. We will make it clear when we use this assumption in the later analysis.
Consider two circles, one with radius r1 centered at a distance a from the origin, and the other one with
radius r2 centered at a distance b. We denote by I(a, r1, b, r2) the intersection region of these two circles,
while we use I(a, r1, b, r2) to represent the area of this region, which could be obtained as [17]
I(a, r1, b, r2)) =r
2
2 cos
−1
((b− a)2 + r22 − r21
2|b− a|r2
)
+ r21 cos
−1
((b− a)2 + r21 − r22
2|b− a|r1
)
− 1/2
√
(−|b− a|+ r1 + r2)(|b− a|+ r2 − r1)(|b− a| − r2 + r1)(|b− a|+ r2 + r1).
(5)
Lemma 2. Let u be a node located randomly and uniformly on I(0, Ra, rv, R) with rv ≥ Ra, as shown
in Fig. 3. Also let r be the random variable representing u’s distance from the center of attack (i.e., the
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Fig. 3. Figure shows the intersection area I(0, Ra, rv, R). We are interested in finding ψ(r), the PDF of the distance r of a node u located
randomly and uniformly on I(0, Ra, rv, R).
origin). Then the probability distribution function (PDF) of r is given as
ψ(r) =


2r
I(0, Ra, rv, R)
arccos
(r2v −R2 + r2
2rvr
)
if r + rv > R
2pir
I(0, Ra, rv, R)
if r + rv ≤ R.
(6)
IV. UPPER BOUND ON THE FAILURE RATIO
In this section, we turn our attention to a necessary condition for having a cascade. A cascade of
failures is possible only if at least one node outside the attack region fails due to the load redistribution.
Otherwise, if the load of the attacked nodes in A is completely absorbed by the rest of the network, the
propagation of failure does not occur. By finding the probability of this event, we could derive an upper
bound on the average failure ratio.
We start our analysis for the finite-size networks by investigating the load received by nodes outside
the attack region, immediately after the attack. This is the load received by immediate neighbors of the
attacked nodes after the very first load redistribution. Note that this load is a random variable. Also recall
that the neighbors of the attacked region are all located in A1. We will first find the mean and standard
deviation of the load received by these nodes. Having the statistics of this random variable, we then
show that its distribution could be well approximated by a Gaussian random variable. Using such an
9approximation, we then find the probability of an overload for the nodes in A1, which later helps us find
an upper bound on the average failure ratio. Recall that “average” here stands for an average taken over
all graph realizations. Before presenting the main result of this section, we need to state the following
lemmas, whose proofs could be found in the appendix.
Lemma 3. Let du be a Poisson random variable with density λu. We then have
E[
1
du
| du > 0] = e
−λug(λu)
1− e−λu , (7)
E[
1
d2u
| du > 0] = e
−λu
1− e−λu
∫ λu
−∞
1
x
g(x)dx, (8)
where
g(x) =
∞∑
k=1
1
k
xk
k!
=
∫ x
−∞
ez − 1
z
dz. (9)
Lemma 4. Consider a node v located at a distance rv ∈ [Ra, Ra + R) from the center of attack. Also
consider a node u, a neighbor of v, located inside the attacked region at a distance r < Ra from the
center, as shown in Fig. 4. The average load lu redistributed to v from u can be obtained as
E[lu|r] = e
−λJ(r)g(λJ(r))
1− e−λJ(r) , h
(1)(r), (10)
where g(·) is defined in (9) and J(r) = piR2 − I(r, R, 0, Ra). Moreover, we have
E[l2u|r] =
e−λJ(r)
1− e−λJ(r)
∫ λJ(r)
−∞
g(x)
x
dx , h(2)(r). (11)
If u is located randomly and uniformly on I(rv, R, 0, Ra), we have
E[lu] =
∫ Ra
rv−R
h(1)(r)× ψ(r) dr, (12)
E[l2u] =
∫ Ra
rv−R
h(2)(r)× ψ(r) dr. (13)
If R− rv ≥ Ra, we obtain J(r) = J∗ , piR2 − piR2a, and (12) and (13) could be reduced to
E[lu] =
e−λJ
∗
g(λJ∗)
1− e−λJ∗ ,
E[l2u] =
e−λJ
∗
1− e−λJ∗
∫ λJ∗
−∞
g(x)
x
dx. (14)
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Fig. 4. Figure shows the setting in the proof of Lemma 4. Black nodes are neighbors of v in the attacked region.
Finally, given E[lu] and E[l2u], the variance σ2lu is given as
σ2lu = E[l
2
u]− E2[lu]. (15)
The following theorem applies the results of Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 to find the mean and variance of the
load redistributed to a node at distance rv from the center of attack, right after the attack.
Theorem 1. Consider a node v located at a distance rv ∈ [Ra, Ra + R) from the center of attack. Let
Lv be the load redistributed to v by its neighbors inside the attacked region. We then have
E[Lv] = λI(rv, R, 0, Ra)
∫ Ra
rv−R
h(1)(r)× ψ(r) dr, (16)
σ2Lv = λI(rv, R, 0, Ra)× σ2lu , (17)
where h(1)(r) is defined in (10), and σ2lu is given by (15). If R− rv ≥ Ra, (16) and (17) are reduced to
E[Lv] = λpiR
2
a ×
e−λJ
∗
g(λJ∗)
1− e−λJ∗ ,
σ2Lv = λpiR
2
a × σ2lu , (18)
where g(·) is given by (9), and J∗ = piR2 − piR2a.
Now that we have the mean and variance of Lv, an approximation of Lv’s PDF could be obtained using
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the central limit theorem as follows. Note that
Lv =
N∑
u=1
lu, (19)
where N is the number of nodes inside I(rv, R, 0, Ra), a Poisson r.v. with mean λI(rv, R, 0, Ra). Given
that N = n, the nodes u = 1, ..., n would be distributed randomly and independently on I(rv, R, 0, Ra),
making lu’s i.i.d. random variables. Therefore, for large values of n, the central limit theorem asserts
that the probability distribution of Lv is well-approximated by a Gaussian random variable. In practice,
however, n ≥ 5 is large enough to ensure a PDF very close to the normal random variable [17]. The
following corollary is a formal statement of what we just explained.
Corollary 1. If λ×I(rv, R, 0, Ra) >> 1, the load received by a node v at rv could be approximated by a
Gaussian r.v. Lv ∼ N (L¯v, σ2Lv), where L¯v and σ2Lv are given by (16) and (17), respectively. In particular,
we have
Pr{v fails} = Pr{Lv > α− 1} ≈ 1− Φ(α− 1− L¯v
σLv
), (20)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution with mean
0 and variance 1.
When λI(rv, R, 0, Ra) is small due to either λ or I(rv, R, 0, Ra), the load received by v becomes very
small. Since the Gaussian-approximated value for Lv also becomes small in this case, the error in the
approximation becomes negligible. The following theorem employs this fact along with Corollary 1 to
find the probability of survival for the nodes in A1 after the very first round of load redistribution.
Theorem 2. Let v be a node located randomly and uniformly on A1. Also let p1 be the probability that
the load received by v is less than or equal to α− 1, i.e., p1 , Pr{Lv ≤ α− 1}. Then, p1 is obtained as
p1 ≈
∫ Ra+R
Ra
Φ
(α− 1− L¯v
σLv
)× 2pirv|A1| drv. (21)
Note that L¯v and σLv are functions of rv, given by Theorem 1.
Using the finding of Theorem 2, an upper bound on the average failure ratio can be obtained for finite
values of λ.
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Fig. 5. The upper bound from Theorem 3 against the simulation results, provided for a dish attack on a network G(λ = 400, R = 0.1).
Theorem 3. The average failure ratio due to a dish attack of radius Ra is upper-bounded as
f¯ ≤ 1− e−λ1(1−p1), (22)
where
λ1 = λpi
(
(Ra +R)
2 − R2a
) (23)
is the density of nodes in A1, and p1 is given by Theorem 2.
Fig. 5 depicts the upper bound from Theorem 3 for different values of network parameters, where
we also include the simulation results for the exact value of f¯ . As seen, the proposed upper bound is
especially helpful when it comes to picking a value of α to avoid a cascade. For example, for the network
G(λ = 400, R = 0.1), the upper bound suggests that α = 3 is a good choice to contain dish attacks of
radius Ra = 0.1 or smaller.
V. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF UPPER BOUND AND THRESHOLD BEHAVIOR OF FAILURE RATIO
While Theorem 3 provides an upper bound on the failure ratio in finite-size networks, an asymptotic
analysis of the upper bound could provide intuition regarding the behavior of a large network under
attacks. As we will see, such an analysis reveals the threshold behavior of the failure ratio in terms of the
tolerance parameter. For the case with λ→∞, it could be shown that as the tolerance parameter increases
above 1, the failure ratio drops from 1 to 0 at a critical value of the tolerance parameter. We will find
13
such critical value, which could be very helpful when studying large networks’ robustness to cascades.
We start our analysis by finding what happens to the load Lv in Theorem 1 when λ→∞. In this section,
in order to explicitly show the dependence of Lv on rv, we use the notation L(rv) instead of Lv for the
load received by node v located at rv. This slight modification will prove helpful in understanding the
analysis.
Theorem 4. Consider a dish attack of radius Ra applied to a network G(λ,R). Let L(rv) be the load
received by a node v located at a distance rv ∈ [Ra, Ra + R) from the center of attack, right after the
attack. When λ→∞, L(rv) is no longer a random variable, and given as
L(rv)
λ→∞
→ 2
∫ Ra
rv−R
r
J(r)
arccos
(r2v −R2 + r2
2rvr
)
dr, (24)
where J(r) = piR2 − I(r, R, 0, Ra).
Having the asymptotic value of L(rv) from Theorem 4, a sufficient condition for a cascade of failures
in the asymptotic case could be obtained as below.
Theorem 5. Consider a healthy node v located at rv ≥ Ra after a dish attack of radius Ra on G(λ,R)
where λ→∞. Let
αU , 1 + L(Ra) = 1 + 2
∫ Ra
Ra−R
r
J(r)
arccos
(R2a − R2 + r2
2Rar
)
dr. (25)
If α < αU and all the nodes located at r < rv have failed, then v will fail as well. Hence, a cascade of
failures occurs throughout the network, resulting in f¯ = 1.
The following theorem combines the sufficient condition from Theorem 5 with a necessary condition
for a cascade, proving a threshold behavior for the average failure ratio in the asymptotic regime.
Theorem 6. Consider a dish attack of radius Ra applied to a network G(λ,R) where λ → ∞. Let αU
be the value of α given by (25). Then, f¯ = 0 if α ≥ αU , and f¯ = 1 if α < αU .
Fig. 6 demonstrates the evolution of the average failure ratio f¯ as λ grows larger. It also shows the
value of αU given by Theorem 5 for the asymptotic case. As it can be seen, a phase transition around
αU becomes clear as λ increases.
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Fig. 6. Figure illustrates the threshold behavior of failure ratio in terms of α. The dashed curve shows the threshold value αU given by
Theorem 5. Simulation results (solid lines) are presented for a dish attack of radius Ra = 0.1 on G(λ,R = 0.1) for different values of λ.
VI. LOWER BOUND ON THE FAILURE RATIO
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the failure ratio by analyzing a sufficient condition for the
propagation of failures throughout the network. This condition is based on the fact that if a cascade cannot
be stopped in the presence of a) full cooperation between nodes, and b) the most favorable connectivity
condition, then for sure it cannot be stopped without them. We first provide the lower bound for finite-size
networks.
Theorem 7. Consider the connected subspace Gc(λ,R) of the probability space G(λ,R), introduced in
Section II. Suppose that a dish attack of radius Ra is applied to Gc(λ,R). Also let q denote the ratio
Ra/R. If
α < 3/2 + q, (26)
then we have
f¯ ≥ e−a¯
∞∑
k=1
Φ
( k
α−1
− a¯1√
a¯1
) a¯k
k!
, (27)
where a¯ = λpiR2a, a¯1 = λpi[(Ra +R)2 − R2a], and Φ(·) is the CDF of a standard normal distribution.
In practice, the summation in (27) needs to be calculated only for ⌊2a¯⌋ or ⌊3a¯⌋ terms. For that, let us
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consider the terms after k = ⌊3a¯⌋ in (27). We have
e−a¯
∞∑
⌊3a¯⌋+1
Φ
( k
α−1
− a¯1√
a¯1
) a¯k
k!
(a)
≤ e−a¯
∞∑
⌊3a¯⌋+1
a¯k
k!
= Pr{a ≥ ⌊3a¯⌋+ 1} ≤ Pr{a ≥ 3a¯}
(b)
≤ e
−a¯(e× a¯)3a¯
(3a¯)3a¯
= (
e2
33
)a¯ = (0.2737)a¯
(c)
≤ (0.2737)3
= 0.0205, (28)
where (a) holds because we have Φ(·) ≤ 1, (b) is obtained by applying the Chernoff bound to the Poisson
tail probability [18] 1, and (c) is due to our assumption of a¯ ≥ 3 in this paper. The small value 0.0205,
when compared to 1, could be safely omitted for practical purposes.
Before proving Theorem 7, we need to state a few lemmas. Recall the rings Ai, i ≥ 1, in Fig. 1. A
cascade of failures, at each stage of its progress, goes through one of these rings. Let us look at how the
failure propagates after the attack. After an attack on A, all the nodes that may potentially fail in the next
step are the neighbors of A located in A1. If some of the nodes in A1 fail, the next step of propagation
includes some nodes in A1 and A2. In general, if the failures have already been spread trough A1, ...,Ai,
potential failures of the next step are all in (A1 ∪ ...∪Ai)∪Ai+1. We know that ai’s are Poisson random
variables with parameter a¯i’s given by (3). Lemmas 5 and 6 below establish a connection between a¯i’s
and α. We use this connection later in Lemma 7 to prove a useful property in finding the lower bound.
The proofs of all lemmas can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 5. Let q = Ra/R. Given that a = a0, if α− 1 < 1/2 + q, we have
a¯2
a¯1
<
α
α− 1 . (29)
Lemma 6. For i ≥ 2, we have
a¯i+1
a¯i
≤ a¯i
a¯i−1
. (30)
Particularly, if α− 1 < 1/2 + q as in Lemma 5, we have
a¯i+1
a¯i
≤ a¯2
a¯1
<
α
α− 1 , (31)
for i ≥ 2.
1An upper Bound for the tail probability of a Poisson random variable X ∼ Poi(λ) can be derived using a Chernoff bound argument
[18]: Pr{X ≥ x} ≤ e−λ(eλ)x
xx
, for x > λ.
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Remark 1. Gaussian approximation for ai, i ≥ 1: Recall Lemma 1 and the discussion afterwards where
we explained how our assumptions for λpiR2a and λpiR2 lead to a¯i > 14, for i ≥ 1. This means that the
Poisson r.v. ai is well approximated by a Gaussian r.v. with the same mean and variance as ai given by
(3). We use this approximation in proving the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Given that a = a0 and α− 1 < 1/2 + q, the following property holds for ai, i ≥ 0.
Pr{a0 + a1 + ...+ ai > ai+1(α− 1)} ≥ Pr{a0 > a1(α− 1)}. (32)
Using the preliminary results stated above, we obtain the following theorem regarding a total-failure
cascade in a finite-size network, whose proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 8. Suppose a dish attack of radius Ra is applied to Gc(λ,R). Given that a = a0, if α−1 < 1/2+q,
the probability that all the nodes fail is lower-bounded by Pr{a0 > a1(α− 1)}.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7: Let us define an identity random variable Xa as
Xa =


1 if a causes a total failure,
0 otherwise.
We can write
f¯ ≥
∑
a≥0
XaPr{Xa = 1} (a)=
∑
k≥1
Pr{a > (α− 1)a1|a = k} × Pr{a = k} (33)
(b)
= e−a¯
∞∑
k=1
Φ
( k
α−1
− a¯1√
a¯1
) a¯k
k!
, (34)
where (a) is due to Lemma 8, and (b) follows from the Gaussian distribution of a1 and Poisson distribution
of a. 
Fig. 7 depicts the lower bound from Theorem 7 along with the simulation result for the average failure
ratio. The upper bound from Theorem 3 is also shown for comparison. As we see, the two bounds together
successfully predict the interval within which the failure ratio decreases from 1 to 0.
A. Asymptotic Analysis of the Lower Bound
Here, we look at the lower bound obtained in the previous section from an asymptotic point of view.
As λ grows very large, similar to what was observed for the upper bound in Section V, the lower bound
17
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
λ=400, R
a
=R=0.1
α
Av
e.
 F
ai
lu
re
 R
at
io
 
 
Upper Bound
Simulation
Lower Bound
(a) Dish attack of radius Ra = 0.1 applied to G(λ = 400, R = 0.1).
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(b) Dish attack of radius Ra = 0.2 applied to G(λ = 400, R = 0.1).
Fig. 7. Simulation results for the average failure ratio versus α, along with the lower bound of Theorem 7 and upper bound of Theorem 3.
The results are shown for dish attacks of radii Ra = 0.1 and Ra = 0.2, respectively, applied to G(λ = 400, R = 0.1). Network diameter
D is set to 1.
takes the shape of a step function. That is, there exists a value of α, denoted as αL, such that f¯ takes the
value of 1 for α < αL, and it takes the value of 0 for α ≥ αL. The following theorem derives the value
of αL.
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Fig. 8. αL versus Ra/R, showing that αL grows sub-linearly with Ra/R.
Theorem 8. Consider the probability space G(λ,R) when λ→∞. Suppose that a dish attack of radius
Ra is applied to G(λ,R). Also let q denote the ratio Ra/R. If
α < αL , 1 +
q2
1 + 2q
, (35)
all the nodes would fail.
Fig. 8 depicts the variation of αL over q = Ra/R. As seen, αL grows sub-linearly with Ra/R. It
is important to note that given R and Ra, αL and αU will not be equal. In other words, unlike the
upper bound, our proposed lower bound is not tight asymptotically. The following lemmas help us prove
Theorem 8. While Lemma 6 holds for the asymptotic case, Lemma 9 below is the asymptotic version of
Lemma 5. Also, Lemma 10 below can be interpreted as the asymptotic version of Lemma 7. The proofs
can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 9. Consider a dish attack of radius Ra applied to G(λ,R). Let q = Ra/R. If α < 1 + q21+2q , we
have
• a¯1(α− 1) < a¯,
• a¯2(α− 1) < a¯1 + a¯.
19
Lemma 10. Consider the setting of Lemma 9. If α− 1 < q2
1+2q
, for every i ≥ 1 we have
a¯+ a¯1 + ... + a¯i > a¯i+1(α− 1). (36)
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 8.
Proof of Theorem 8: The proof is mostly along the same lines as for Lemma 8 with a few minor
changes. First note that as λ grows very large, the network become connected. So there is no need to
consider the subspace Gc(λ,R) here. Second, a is given as the initial number of failed nodes due to the
attack. However, when λ → ∞, a tends to a¯. Similarly, ai tends to a¯i for i ≥ 1. Just like Lemma 8, in
the best scenario, a¯1(α − 1) is the excess capacity available to absorb the load from the a¯ failed nodes.
If α − 1 < q2/(1 + 2q), then we have a¯ > a¯1(α− 1). In this case, A1 cannot absorb the load of A, and
the aggregate load of a¯+ a¯1 needs to be absorbed by the rest of the nodes. However, Lemma 10 asserts
that such an absorbtion will not be realized as the failure propagates through A2, A3, and the outer rings
until it takes out the whole network. 
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the problem of cascading failures in finite-size networks modeled by random
geometric graphs. Rigorous analytical results have been provided for studying the network resiliency
under a dish attack of a given size. In particular, the average failure ratio due to the attack was studied
in terms of the tolerance parameter, which is a critical design consideration in real-life networks. By
deriving the lower and upper bounds on the average failure ratio, we were able to track the network
reaction to different attacks. The asymptotic analysis of both bounds has also been presented. Particularly,
the asymptotic analysis of the upper bound revealed the threshold behavior of the network reaction to
the changes in the tolerance parameter. Our findings can be exploited to choose appropriate values of the
tolerance parameter to avoid a cascade in a given network.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: First note that for a¯1 we have
a¯1 =piλ[(Ra +R)
2 − R2a] = piλR2 + 2piλRRa
≥ 6 + 2
√
pi2λ2R2R2a ≥ 6 + 2
√
3× 6 = 6(1 +
√
2) > 14. (37)
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For i ≥ 2, a¯i is equal to λ times the area of Ai. Since the area of Ai is clearly larger than that of Ai−1,
we obtain a¯i ≥ a¯i−1, which along with (37) leads to a¯i ≥ a¯1 > 14 for i ≥ 2. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider the angle θˆ in Fig. 3 and the arc of radius r associated with θˆ crossing
over the node i. Let us denote the length of this arc by ω. The PDF of r can be obtained by considering
the probability of node i being located inside the tiny area between the dashed lines, thus we have
ψ(r) =
2ω
I(0, Ra, rv, R)
. (38)
Given θˆ, ω can be found as ω = θˆ× r. Now we only need to find θˆ. Note that θˆ is an angle in a triangle
with sides r, rv, and R. Particularly, θˆ is opposite to the side of length R. Therefore, we have
θˆ = arccos
(r2v −R2 + r2
2rvr
)
. (39)
The equation above holds when r + rv > R. For the case r + rv ≤ R, we simply have θˆ = pi. 
Proof of Lemma 3: We first have
E[1/du] =
∞∑
k=1
1
k
× Pr{du = k | du ≥ 1} (40)
E[1/d2u] =
∞∑
k=1
1
k2
× Pr{du = k | du ≥ 1}. (41)
Since du ∼ Poi(λu), we have
Pr{du = k | du ≥ 1} = e
−λuλku
k!(1− e−λu) . (42)
Therefore,
E[1/du] =
e−λu
1− e−λu
∞∑
k=1
1
k
λku
k!
(43)
E[1/d2u] =
e−λu
1− e−λu
∞∑
k=1
1
k2
λku
k!
. (44)
To find a closed-form for the summations above, we have
∞∑
k=0
1
k + 1
λk+1u
(k + 1)!
=
∫ ∞∑
k=0
λku
(k + 1)!
dλu. (45)
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For the expression under the integral, we could use the Taylor expansion of an exponential function as
∞∑
k=0
λku
(k + 1)!
=
1
λu
∞∑
k=1
λku
k!
=
eλu − 1
λu
. (46)
Substituting (46) into (45) yields (9). Note that the integral in (9) could be evaluated numerically. Along
the same lines, we could find the following for the summation in (44):
∞∑
k=1
1
k2
λku
k!
=
∫ λu
−∞
∞∑
k=1
1
k
xk−1
k!
dx =
∫ λu
−∞
1/x
∫ x
−∞
∞∑
k=0
yk
(k + 1)!
dy =
∫ λu
−∞
g(x)
x
dx. (47)
Substituting (47) in (44) gives us (8). 
Proof of Lemma 4: The load of i will be redistributed equally among its neighbors outside A. Let us
denote the number of such neighbors by du. The average load received by v is h(1)(r) = E[1/du|r, du > 0]
where the average is taken over du. Given that i is located at r, du is distributed as Poi
(
λu = λ(piR
2 −
I(r, R, 0, Ra))
)
. As a result, by applying Lemma 3 we obtain
h(1)(r) = E[1/du|r, du > 0] = e
−λJ(r)g(λJ(r))
1− e−λJ(r) . (48)
If i is located randomly and uniformly on I(rv, R, 0, Ra), the probability density function of its distance
from the center is given by ψ(r) at (6). Applying ψ(r) to find E[h(r)(1)] and E[h(r)(2)] by taking average
over r leads to (12) and (13). When R−rv ≥ Ra, the attacked region entirely resides in v’s neighborhood;
hence, the averaging of (12) or (13) over r is no longer needed, and we obtain (14). 
Proof of Theorem 1: Let us denote the number of neighbors of v inside I(rv, R, 0, Ra) by N . Note that
N ∼ Poi(λI(rv, R, 0, Ra)). Let lu, u = 1, ..., N , denote the sequence of r.v.’s corresponding to the load
redistributed to v by its neighbors. As it has been shown in the proof of Lemma 4, lu completely depends
on a Poisson point process outside I(rv, R, 0, Ra), whereas N is given by a Poisson point process inside
I(rv, R, 0, Ra). Hence, N and the random variables lu, u = 1, ..., N are independent. Therefore, we can
write
E[Lv] = E[
N∑
u=1
lu] = E
[
E[
N∑
u=1
lu|N = n]
] (49)
(a)
= E[N ]× E[lu] (b)= λI(rv, R, 0, Ra)×
∫ Ra
rv−R
h(r)× ψ(r) dr, (50)
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where (a) follows from Wald’s identity [17] and the fact that a Poisson point process, given the number
of points, becomes a uniform point process. Also, (b) follows from replacing E[lu] with (12) from Lemma
4. Similarly, for σL we have
σ2Lv = E[(Lv − L¯v)2] = E
[
E[(
N∑
u=1
(lu − l¯u))2|N = n]
] (51)
= E[N ]× E[(lu − l¯u)2] = λI(rv, R, 0, Ra)× σ2lu . (52)
When R− rv ≥ Ra, A is entirely included in v’s neighborhood. Thus, E[N ] = λpiR2a, and E[lu] is given
by (14), together leading to (18). 
Proof of Theorem 2: Since v is located randomly and uniformly in A1, the PDF of rv is obtained as
2pirv
|A1|
. Thus we have
p1 =
∫ Ra+R
Ra
Pr{Lv ≤ α− 1} × 2pirv|A1| drv. (53)
It remains to find Pr{Lv ≤ α − 1}. According to Corollary 1, if λ × I(rv, R, 0, Ra) >> 1, we have
Pr{Lv ≤ α− 1} ≈ Φ
(
α−1−L¯v
σLv
)
. However, this holds either when rv is close to Ra or when λ is large. If
v is located far from the edge of the attack, I(rv, R, 0, Ra) might be small, and λ× I(rv, R, 0, Ra) >> 1
may not hold for moderate values of λ. However, as I(rv, R, 0, Ra) becomes smaller, J(·) in (10) and (11)
becomes larger for the neighbors of v in A, causing E[lu] and E[l2u] to drop quickly for these neighbors.
At the same time, the number of such neighbors, which is a Poisson r.v. with mean λ× I(rv, R, 0, Ra),
becomes smaller. Therefore, as rv grows larger, both L¯v and σLv in (16) drop quickly until they become
zero when rv = Ra + R. As a result, Pr{Lv ≤ α − 1} grows rapidly as rv increases, and becomes very
close to 1. This can also be verified using numerical methods. Now, since Φ
(
α−1−L¯v
σLv
)
also takes values
very close to one in such cases, approximating Pr{Lv ≤ α − 1} by Φ
(
α−1−L¯v
σLv
)
will have a negligible
effect on the value of p1. Applying such an approximation leads to (21). 
Proof of Theorem 3: Since 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, we have
f¯ ≤ Pr{f = 0} × 0 + Pr{f > 0} × 1 = Pr{f > 0} = Pr{at least 1 failure in S \ A}
= Pr{at least 1 failure in A1} = 1− p0, (54)
where p0 , Pr{no failures in A1}. Note that p0 is the probability that the load received by every node
in A1 is less than α− 1. Let us denote by P (k) the probability that there are k nodes in A1. Also recall
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that p1 is the probability that the load received by a node located randomly and uniformly in A1 is less
than α− 1. We then have
p0 =
∞∑
k=0
P (k)pk1 =
∞∑
k=0
e−λ1
k!
λk1p
k
1 = e
−λ1
∞∑
k=0
(λ1p1)
k
k!
= e−λ1eλ1p1 = e−λ1(1−p1). (55)
Substituting p1 above by its value given by Theorem 2, and then substituting (55) into (54), we obtain
(22). 
Proof of Theorem 4: In order to prove the theorem, we will show that, as λ→∞, we have σLv → 0 ,
and E[L(rv)] takes the righthand side of (24). First note that when λ→∞, by applying the L’Hopital’s
rule [17] to (10) and (11) we obtain
h(1)(r) = E[lu|r] →
λ→∞
1
λJ(r)
, (56)
h(2)(r) = E[l2u|r] →
λ→∞
1
[λJ(r)]2
. (57)
Substituting (56) into (16) gives us the asymptotic average of L(rv) in (24). Now let us show that the
asymptotic value of σLv tends to 0. Using (12), (13), and (15), we find that
σ2lu
λ→∞
→ m(rv)
λ2
, (58)
where
m(rv) =
2
I(rv, R, 0, Ra)
∫ Ra
rv−R
r
[J(r)]2
arccos
(r2v −R2 + r2
2rvr
)
dr
− 4
[I(rv, R, 0, Ra)]2
[ ∫ Ra
rv−R
r
J(r)
arccos
(r2v −R2 + r2
2rvr
)
dr
]2
(59)
is a function of rv, taking only finite values. Now considering (17) for σ2Lv we have
σ2Lv = λI(rv, R, 0, Ra)× σ2lu →
λ→∞
I(rv, R, 0, Ra)
λ
m(rv) →
λ→∞
0. (60)

Proof of Theorem 5: In the best case, let us assume that all the nodes located at r > rv are healthy
and have received no load so far. We will show that v still fails in this case. Note that this assumption
is equivalent to having a dish attack of radius rv ≥ Ra. Let us denote by L(r) and L′(r) the asymptotic
load distribution right after the attack for attacks of radius Ra and rv, respectively. Since the latter is a
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larger attack, we have
L′(rv) ≥ L(Ra) = αU − 1 > α− 1. (61)
Therefore node v fails. Applying the same procedure to nodes located at r > rv results in a propagation
of failures throughout the network, leading to f¯ = 1. 
Proof of Theorem 6: Looking at (24) in Theorem 4, it could be concluded that in the asymptotic case
the closer a node is to the attack region (i.e., the smaller is rv), the larger is the load it receives right
after the attack. Therefore, we have L(Ra) > L(rv), for rv > Ra. Consequently, for α ≥ αU , we have
L(rv) < L(Ra) = αU − 1 ≤ α− 1, (62)
which means that none of the nodes in A1 would fail. Hence, there will not be any propagation of failures,
resulting in f¯ = 0. It remains to prove that a cascade of failures is assured when we have α < αU . In
this case we have L(Ra) = αU − 1 > α− 1, which means that every node located at Ra would fail. Now,
by simply applying Theorem 5 for rv = Ra, we have f¯ = 1. 
Proof of Lemma 5: We need to show that
a¯2
a¯1
=
(Ra + 2R)
2 − (Ra +R)2
(Ra +R)2 − R2a
= 1 +
2R
R + 2Ra
< 1 +
1
α− 1 ,
⇒ α− 1 < R + 2Ra
2R
= 1/2 +
Ra
R
⇒ α− 1 < 1/2 + q. (63)
However, (63) is given by the lemma’s assumption, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 6: We need to show that
a¯i+1 × a¯i−1 ≤ a¯2i
⇒ (R2i+1 −R2i )(R2i−1 − R2i−2) ≤ (R2i − R2i−1)2
⇒ (2Ra + (2i+ 1)R)(2Ra + (2i− 3)R) ≤ (2Ra + (2i− 1)R)2. (64)
If we set x1 = 2Ra + (2i+ 1)R and x2 = 2Ra + (2i− 3)R, (64) could be deducted from the “inequality
of arithmetic and geometric means” [19], asserting that for two non-negative numbers x1 and x2 we have
x1 + x2
2
≥ √x1x2 ⇒ (x1 + x2
2
)2 ≥ x1x2. (65)
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Now that (30) is proved, (31) could be obtained by simply applying the second item of Lemma 5. 
Proof of Lemma 7: We prove the theorem by induction. For i = 0 the equality holds. Let us assume
that the theorem holds for i = k − 1, k > 1; we prove that it holds for i = k as well. We have
Pr{a0 + a1 + ...+ ak > ak+1(α− 1)}
(a)
≥Pr{a0 + a1 + ... + ak−1 + ak > akα} (66)
= Pr{a0 + a1 + ...+ ak−1 > ak(α− 1)}
(b)
≥ Pr{a0 > a1(α− 1)},
(67)
where (a) holds by applying Lemma 6 and the Gaussian distribution of ai, i ≥ 1. In the above, (b) holds
due to the induction assumption made for i = k − 1. 
Proof of Lemma 8: Here a0 is given as the initial number of failed nodes due to the attack. At its best,
a1(α − 1) is the excess capacity available to absorb the load of these a0 failed nodes. Now consider a
best-case load distribution strategy where all the nodes in A can collaborate and all the nodes in A1 are
connected to A. Then, nodes in A can distribute their loads equally among the nodes in set A1 in order
to use all the excess capacity and avoid a cascade. If a0 > a1(α − 1), A1 cannot absorb the load of A,
and the aggregate load of a0 + a1 needs to be absorbed by rest of the nodes. However, Lemma 7 asserts
that such an absorbtion becomes even less likely, and the failure propagates through A2, A3, and outer
rings until it takes out the whole network. Therefore, the probability of a total failure is lower-bounded
by Pr{a0 > a1(α− 1)}. 
Proof of Lemma 9: In order to prove the first item, note that we have
a¯1(α− 1) < a¯⇒ α− 1 < a¯
a¯1
=
R2a
R2 + 2RaR
=
q2
1 + 2q
. (68)
Moving on to prove the second item, given that a1(α− 1) < a0, it suffices to show that
a¯2(α− 1) < αa¯1 = a¯1 + a¯1(α− 1) < a¯1 + a¯. (69)
From Lemma 5, we already know
α− 1 < 1/2 + q ⇒ a¯1 × α > a¯2(α− 1). (70)
To complete the proof, we only need to show that (68) leads to (70), i.e., we need to have
q2
1 + 2q
< 1/2 + q. (71)
26
Inequality (71) can be rewritten as
q2 + 2q + 1/2 > 0⇒ (q + 1)2 − 1/2 > 0⇒ (q + 1− 1√
2
)(q + 1 +
1√
2
) > 0, (72)
which always holds since q > 0. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 10: The proof is simple and is given by induction on i. First, note that for i = 1, the
case is proven by Lemma 9. Now suppose that the statement is true for i = k− 1. We show that it holds
for i = k, k ≥ 2, as well. For i = k we have
(a0 + a¯1 + ...+ a¯k−1) + a¯k >a¯k(α− 1) + a¯k
= a¯k × α ≥ a¯k+1(α− 1), (73)
where the last inequality holds due to Lemma 6. 
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